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Open access to resources implies the absence of restrictions affecting
extraction or use. Such restrictions may range from common property regimes to
privately held plots or quantities and include many possible combinations and
intermediate arrangements. Whatever the ultimate
unrestricted open access to a stable structure of
requires agreement by a minimum coalltion that is
arrangement, moving from
well-defined use rights
prepared to observe restric-
tive rules. These rules can affect the rate of resource use, the distribution
of returns, or other management practices. They may arise from within a
1/
resource using group or be coercively imposed from outside.—
In many cases, an outside authority does not exist, and some form of
self-policing is necessary. In international fisheries, for example, open
access has led to overfishing and rules restricting access must be
innovated precisely because a coercive overriding authority is infeasible.
Even where the capacity for coercion exists, an underlying consensus
concerning the efficacy of the restrictions is important. The innovation
of rules In these cases shares many features with oligopoly pricing or
constitutional government, in which agents must exercise some form of
‘“self-command. “
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innovation of such rules as a strategically
From the point of view of a particular agent
in a resource-consuming population, innovating these restrictions involves three
decisions: (a) deciding on a rule that will restrict future actions; (b)
deciding whether to enter into the initial coalition observing this rule; (c)
deciding whether to continue to be bound by the rule and remain part of the
coalition in succeeding periods. I shall be primarily concerned with decision
(b). Although this decision can be a function of enforcement by a coercive
authority outside the group, to assume a priori that such an enforcement
authority exists obscures the important inverse relationship between the level of
voluntary cooperation and the need for coercion. It also begs the question of
whether rules innovated where outside coercion is impossible or infeasible can
be partially or even fully self-enforcing.
Rather, I assume that a particular restrictive rule -- such as limited entry
to a fishery -- has been proposed together with a set of penalties and other
coercive arrangements, ex ante. Each agent’s problem is whether voluntarily
2/.
to cooperate (C) with or to defect (D) from the group following this rule —
The need for additional coercion (or an alternative rule) will be revealed by
the level of cooperation and defection, ex post. The higher the level of volun-
tary cooperation, the lower the need for additional coercion and the lower
the social costs of enforcing the resource regime.
Repeating the problem over time makes this a dynamic issue, in which the
parameters affecting the choice are likely to change. ~’ Here I am concerned
with only one in a sequence of decisions to adhere to a given rule. Although
the entire sequence results in a particular pattern of resource use over time,-3-
in which expectations of future use rates are clearly important, systematic
analysis of alternative restrictions requires knowledge of when cooperation
dominates defection for a sufficiently large group (given expectations) at each
point In time. This paper employs a simple framework which can be used to
illustrate this issue, lending insight into how much coercion may be necessary
in alternative resource regimes.
The decision to cooperate with others in observing a rule, or to defect,
is a binary choice with externalities. It is binary because the choice is
between cooperation and defection, and it has external effects if it alters
the consumption of the resource by other agents. (In trivial cases the
resource is so abundant that no negative external consumption effect occurs.)
For simplicity I assume that agents derive payoffs from cooperation or defection
based only on the number of other agents who also choose either C or D. Among
n + 1 individuals, there are 2n possible configurations of choice, depending on
how many choose C or D. Again for simplicity, I assume no differences in inten-
sity of resource use across agents, although this assumption is not necessary.
The decisions of all agents result in a particular physical product of the
resource (e.g., “total catch”) from which each agent derives positive
utility. Using graphical techniques proposed by Schelling (1973), I consider
this binary choice first in terms of a uniform multiperson prisoners dilemma
(MPD), then extend the analysis to include multiple equilibria and the absence
of dominant strategies, which I have argued elsewhere may better approximate
actual resource decisions (Runge, 1981, 1984a). This approach provides a
theoretical basis for empirical testing of complex incentive structures in
various resource regimes. I conclude with several empirical implications and
hypotheses generated by the analysis.-4-
The Multlperson Prlsonerst Dilemma (MPD)
The MPD 1s characterized by n agents each with the same binary choice and
the same payoffs. Each agent has a
is douunant for all n agents. Each
others’ choice, so that preferences
dominant choice, whatever others do, which
also has a dominant preference for the
for others’ actions are unaffected by the
choice he makes himself. These preferences go in opposite directions: each
prefers that all others cooperate while he himself defects so defection strictly
donunates cooperation, and the defection strategy leads to a unique, Pareto-
lnferlor Nash equilibrium. However, there is some number k > 1 such that if k
individuals cooperate and the rest defect, those who cooperate are still better
off than if they had all defected. The uniformity of agents makes k independent
of the particular agents who cooperate or defect, eliminating the possibility
(at this level of analysis) of ‘“leadership.” The number k represents the
minimum coalltlon that can make positive gains by cooperating with the rule
even though others do not. Where k = n, the only rule which is viable is one
in which there are no free riders (a coalition of the whole). Where k < n,
some free riders (n - k) can be tolerated, and the k cooperators can still

















Consider Figure l(a), in which two linear payoff curves are drawn for a
population of n + 1, reflecting the benefits of cooperation and defection in an
interdependent decision framework to the (n+l)th agent, where n equals the number
of “other” resource users in an MPD game. The upper curve corresponds to the
dominant choice of defection D. Its left end is labeled O, the open access
equilibrium, in which no agents cooperate due to the absence of restrictive
rules. The D curve rises monotonically to the right. Below it is the dotinated
cooperation strategy C, which also begins at the open access equilibrium O,
rises monotonically and crosses the axis at point k where positive gains to
cooperation begin. The number choosing to cooperate with the proposed rule in
Figure 1 is denoted by the distance along the horizontal axis. The vertical
axis shows the payoff to cooperation by individual (n+l) when a certain number
of others choose to cooperate and the remainder defect. Atk= n/2 in Figure
l(a), for example, positive gains are made by cooperators whenever at least
half of the other agents cooperate. Because D lies everywhere above C, it is a
strictly dominant strategy. Monotonicity of both curves in the same direction
implies that cooperation leads to uniformly positive externalities, and defec-
tion to uniformly negative externalities. The C curve is higher on the right
than the D curve on the left, reflecting the Pareto-inefficiency of the dominant
defection strategy. The dotted lines show total (or average) values
corresponding to the number of agents choosing the two strategies, and point m
represents the maximum collective payoff (Paretots **maximumd’utilit~
collective”) for the group. The slope of these schedules may be interpreted as
the marginal payoff to defection and cooperation inside the structure of the
game.
In Figure l(a), D rises more rapidly than C, indicating that the more
agents who join the cooperative coalition, the greater is the advantage of-6-
defecting. The collective maximum at point m is achieved with some agents
choosing D and some C. Moreover, point m falls to the right of k on the hori-
zontal axis. This implies that collective gains are greatest when there are
more than k cooperators,
and diminish thereafter.
an alternative incentive
its benefits after about
and that these gains reach a maximum at point m,
In l(b), the slopes of the C and D functions reflect
structure, in which the proposed rule achieves most of
half of the population participates, and benefits
diminish thereafter. The collective maximum occurs at about two-thirds
participation, with room for gains to cooperators from point k to point m along
the horizontal axis. Cases l(a) and l(b).represent two of an infinite number
of possible variations on the MPD example, a distinguishing feature of which is
that defection strictly dominates, making some form of coercion necessary
to solve the problem of collective action (Sen, 1967). Restrictive rules and the
level of coercion accompanying them alter the payoffs, and thus the level and
shape, of the C and D schedules.
Alternative incentive structures can be represented in the same
framework, in which the C and D curves may (a) cross or not; (b) rise in the
same or opposite direction; (c) be vertically arranged so that D is above C or
below it; (d) have the same or different slopes and curvatures. All of these
variations represent different incentive structures leadlng to particular deci-
sions to join in a coalition following a rule of resource use.
Multiple Equilibria
Consider the more complex (and arguably more realistic) case in which neither
C nor D represents a strictly dominant strategy. This situation is not captured by
the MPD, in which defection dominates throughout. In constrast, Figure 2(a) shows
a situation in which a linear D curve dominates a linear C curve until point y,























the problem of coordinating the expectations of a “critical mass” of agents
around a particular rule change. In Figure 2(a), there are two equilibria:
one at O and one at z. The problem of coordination is to achieve the Pareto-
superior equilibrium at z. In cases such as these, the coalition must move
beyond k to the switch point y; otherwise, defection will dominate and lead to
the Pareto-inferior equilibrium at O. Unlike the MPD, in which defection
dominates at all levels of participation, implying the need fc)routside enforce-
ment, this situation rests on the contingent strategies of agents. If enough
people choose C in the first place, then z will emerge as the equilibrium.
However, if a Pareto-inferior open access equilibrium has becc)meestablished,
no agent will decide to join a coalition subscribing to a restrictive rule
unless he expects a sufficient number of others to do so. Achieving a Pareto-
superior solution will require an organized change in behavior over and above
the establishment of a viable coalition at point k.~’
In the MPU case, coercion is necessary to achieve cooperation with a
given rule. Once this coercion is undertaken, the game changes, becoming-8-
more like those pictured In Figure 2 as coercion lowers the payoff to defection
in relation to cooperation. If the situation resembles Figure Z ex ante,
however, less coercion may be necessary to organize a change in behavior.
This particular structure of incentives ex ante may make coordination based
on education and information dissemination sufficient to achieve a cooperative
equillblrum. As Hayek (1948) argued, m many cases spontaneous recognition
of the need for organized collective action occurs on the part of the affected
group simply because the payoff to such organization is substantial.
In Figure 2(b), we introduce curvature in the C schedule, which now inter-
sects the D schedule twice. The value to a given agent of defecting 1s high at
low levels of cooperation by others so that defection dominates cooperation
until point y. At point y, people expect a sufficient number of others to
cooperate to be induced to cooperate themselves, and this allows cooperation
to dominate up to z. At z, so many agents are cooperating that it again
becomes advantageous to defect. There are again two equilibria, a Pareto-
superior one at z and an lnferlor one at O.
This structure of incentives, I conjecture, is applicable to a variety of
restricted open access situations. To take the case of the fishery, suppose
that a limited entry rule 1s proposed. Everybody suffers from the open access
situation 0, but it is not worth cooperating with a restrictive rule unless a
suftlclent number (y) of other agents are expected to do so too. Over some
range (from k upward) one’s participation in the coalition observing the rule
leads to enough improvement in the total catch to make observing it beneficial,
although free riders continue to benefit even more. At point y, observing the
catch llmit is clearly superior to free riding since a “critical mSSS” of
others also observe it. liventually, however, so many agents observe the limit
that there appears to be no need for a given agent to do so, and free riding is-9-
again a dominant strategy. Clearly, if this situation characterizes the pay-
offs ex ante, less coercion will be necessary ex post compared with the MPD
case.
Empirical Implications_
Whether the structure of incentives in restricted open access situations
is as conjectured above is an empirical question. Field research is currently
underway in which direct survey methods elicit the perceived threshold of bene-
ficial cooperation k and the level at which different agents believe it accept-
able to defect (see Bromley and Chapagain, 1984). Other recent research
conducted in an experimental setting also examines the need for a “critical
mass” of cooperators (Oliver, MarWell and Teixeira, forthcoming, 1985). The
issue of dominance has also been tested, based on questions about the expected
impact on individual choice of others’ strategies to cooperate or defect (Roth
and Schoumaker, 1983). Explicit applications of Schelling’s framework have
been conducted successfully using experimental techniques (Schwartz-Shea and
Simmons, 1983), although no direct application to natural resources policy has
been developed.
As an agenda for research on rules restricting open access resources, I
would propose further testing of three key hypotheses emerging from the analysis
above.
H1 : Situations exist such that defection from given restrictive rules
of use is not a strictly dominant strategy for all agents.
H2 : The range over which voluntary cooperation dominates defection
is a function of expected payoffs (rents) gained from a given resource
when a “critical mass’”adheres to a rule restricting use.-1o-
H3: Particular restrictions may have a comparative advantage in promoting
voluntary cooperation, reducing the need for coercion in the form of
outside enforcement.
& growing body of evidence already quest%ons the strict dominance of free
rider behavior in a variety of experimental and actual situations (see Isaac,
Walker and Thomas, 1984), suggesting that the MPD may be an inappropriate model
of incentives for restrictions on open access. Little is known, however, about
when and how voluntary cooperation with restrictive rules can be promoted or
organized. Perhaps the most important need is to Isolate empirically the
variables, In additional to outright coercion, that would shift the C schedule
up or D schedule down for particular resources, lowering the threshold at which
voluntary cooperation dominates defection. Isolating resource regimes which are
characterized by high levels of voluntary cooperation would provide important
insights into policies for resource conservation and use, allowing more costly
enforcement mechanisms to be applled only after the innovation of voluntary
restrictions had been given full play.-11-
Footnotes
~/ For two excellent recent discussion of these issues in the context of fisher-
ies, see Young (1983), and Johnson and Libecap (1982).
2_/ It should be noted that any structure of restrictive rules, including
private property, 1s subJect to cooperation or defection.
3_/ These changes make the situation more complex than a simple “iterated”
game (e.g., HardIn, 1982), the limitations of which were noted by Shublk (1970)
in his early exposition. Parameter changes in the game over
what hasly and Spulber (1981) and others have referred to as
which agents must reassess the current state of the resource
time may lead to
“rolling plans,” in
regime in each
period. Among other things, cooperation in a given period may be a function of
rule changes as well as changes in the environment (Runge, 1984b).
~j Schelling (1973, p. 407), echoing Keynes description of the liquidity trap,
notes that “People can
waiting for the others
confidence that enough
get trapped at an inefficient equilibrium, everyone
to switch, nobody willing to be the first unless he has
others will switch to make it worthwhile.”-12-
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